Understanding the Valuation of Location Privacy:  a Crowdsourcing-Based Approach by Poikela, Maija & Toch, Eran
Understanding the Valuation of Location Privacy:  
a Crowdsourcing-Based Approach 
 
Maija Poikela 
Technische Universität Berlin 
maija.poikela@qu.tu-berlin.de
Eran Toch 
Tel Aviv University  
erant@post.tau.ac.il
 
 
Abstract 
The exchange of private information for services 
or other benefits is a commonplace practice today in 
the advent of mobile technology. In the case of mobile 
services, the exchanged commodity is increasingly 
often spatial location of the user. To decide whether 
this transaction is beneficial, the user needs to evaluate 
the exchange value of this commodity. To assess the 
value users give to their location, and to understand its 
relationship with location sharing, we conducted a 
study on a mobile crowdsourcing platform (N=190). 
We find that users' valuation of location privacy is 
dependent on the sharing scenario. For instance, when 
the location is to be shared with an untrusted 
advertiser, the users require a premium as 
compensation for their information. Additionally, 
benefit perception and trust are found to be connected 
with more frequent location sharing, while perceived 
risks and privacy concern are associated with sharing 
one’s location less frequently. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
People’s location information is increasingly 
considered a commodity. Using location-based 
services (LBS), location is constantly being collected 
by multiple parties: service providers collect the data 
for the offered services, but also for selling it to third 
parties. These use it for behavioral advertising based 
on our location or movement patterns. We can either 
protect our privacy by switching the location services 
off or by refraining from using these services, or accept 
the deal and decide that the benefit from sharing the 
location is worth the price of diminished privacy. 
Users have various concerns when using LBS, 
including being stalked and revealing home location 
[1]. Also too well targeted adverts can create privacy 
concern [2]. The concerns can create anxiety, in 
particular if the user feels powerlessness and not in 
control [3]. This can also lead to decreased disclosure, 
or restrict adoption of the service [2]. On the other 
hand, several benefits are available for the users of 
these services: finding restaurants or friends nearby, or 
informing others about one’s whereabouts [4]. To 
assess whether or not the received benefit is worth the 
expected privacy risks, the user needs to perform a 
risk-benefit analysis [5], evaluating how much they 
value each side of the deal. Thus, using the service can 
be considered a privacy transaction. 
The theory of planned behaviour [6] states that the 
intention to act is mediated by several attitudes towards 
the behaviour. First, the positive and negative 
outcomes are weighed – this corresponds to evaluating 
the benefits and risks of using LBS. Second, the 
subjective norms, being the social expectations around 
the behaviour, are evaluated. Third, the subjective and 
actual control over the action have their effect on 
intention, and on the behaviour. In this work, we 
assessed the influence of the risks and benefits, as well 
as that of the normative beliefs, on valuation of 
location privacy. 
We studied how users of a crowdsourcing platform 
value their location privacy in several one-time sharing 
scenarios. We find that the amount of money offered 
for sharing a location, as well as the scenario of what is 
done with the data, have an influence on the 
willingness to share location. The sharing rates were 
altogether rather high, and the amount paid seemed to 
have an influence mostly in the scenarios where the 
location would be shared also with advertisers. In a 
scenario where the location would be shared with an 
untrusted advertiser, the sharing rate was significantly 
lower than otherwise. Normative beliefs did not turn 
out to be a significant factor in predicting location 
sharing behaviour. Rather than stating a specific 
monetary value that is needed in each situation for the 
location to be shared, we use the location valuation as 
an attempt to quantify privacy concern, and for 
evaluating the differences in location sharing patterns. 
The values per se vary largely from one country to 
another [7], and quite likely also from one city to 
another within a country, thus making results regarding 
the exact value less meaningful.  
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2. Related work 
During the last decade, geographical information is 
increasingly often combined with demographic 
information, and used for targeted advertising based on 
the users’ geographical location. Crampton [8] states 
that this commodification of users’ spatial information 
has led to the users being more easily monitored and 
their behaviour controlled, and might even encourage a 
surveillance society, creating a serious threat to 
individuals’ data privacy. Nissenbaum proposed a 
concept of privacy as contextual integrity for 
evaluating the flow of information from individuals 
[9]. Based on a context and norms, an individual has 
certain expectations of what happens to information 
about one’s person – whether or not such information 
is being collected, and who might have access to it. 
Collecting personal information might happen without 
the users’ knowledge and consent, and with analysis 
and aggregation of information being easier than ever, 
the individuals’ expectations of data privacy might not 
be met. The user might engage in an interaction in 
which they trade their privacy to a benefit, but unless 
the individual is fully aware of the terms of the 
interaction, their contextual integrity is jeopardized. 
Leszczynski describes anxiety of control related with 
geographical information of ourselves – the users have  
a desire to control the collection and use of this data, 
but feel powerlessness over  the inability to do so [10]. 
Culnan and Armstrong [11] propose that privacy 
calculus takes place each time prior to the disclosure of 
personal information, within which the benefits of the 
transaction are assessed against the expected privacy 
risk. Also Dinev and Hart [12] present the decision to 
disclose personal information as a fully rational choice 
in the presence of privacy concerns. Preibusch 
however states that privacy concern does not 
necessarily lead to corresponding behaviour [13], but 
disclosure might be the best choice for a user in a given 
situation. Several works describe privacy concern and 
behaviour being at odds; a privacy paradox (e.g. [14]). 
Various studies have assessed how much value 
users give to their privacy. Users have been found to 
sometimes give out personal data even for no 
compensation [15] – Rose reports that the users receive 
significant benefits from information exchange and 
thus the benefits outweigh the possible negative 
consequences. However, according to Tsai et al. [16], 
when presented with an option offering more privacy 
protection, users are willing to even pay a small 
premium for enhanced privacy.  
In a study by Acquisti et al. [17], the order in which 
the user is offered a price for sharing private 
information influences the price that the user assigns to 
that piece of information. Other studies have found the 
willingness to divulge private information to be 
context-dependent; according to John et al., the users 
are more likely to disclose personal information in a 
very informal setting [18]. The users are on the other 
hand found to be poor decision-makers when assessing 
the privacy tradeoff, and likely to undermine long-term 
privacy risks for short-term benefits [19]. 
The users of LBS give varying privacy sensitivity 
ratings to different locations. In a study by Toch et al., 
the users shared location in a social setting with 
acquaintances [20]. Also, users were found to be more 
willing to share locations that have a large and diverge 
set of visitors. How much monetary value users give to 
their location privacy has been studied by Danezis et 
al. [21], where users gave hypothetical values for 
participating in a location-sharing study during a 
period of 28 days. The highest value for a location 
information was given by the users with most variance 
in their moving patterns [21]. Barak et al. found that 
location valuation is dependent on the type of location 
in sharing in a social context [22]. In a study by Cvrcek 
et al. [7], European university students were asked in 
an online questionnaire how much they would need to 
be compensated to participate in a month-long field 
study, supposedly with the location being tracked 
during this time. Later, they were told that also a 
commercial entity would be interested in the data. The 
study did not confirm the results by Danezis et al. [21] 
regarding the movement patterns. Also, in a study by 
Bernheim et al. [23] imitating the survey by Cvrcek et 
al. [7], the expected payment to participate in the study 
approximately doubled compared to the original 
findings, further suggesting that finding an absolute 
value for location privacy might not be the most useful 
and applicable result from such research. 
Trust in the receiving entity has been found to 
decrease privacy concerns [24]. Also, service 
providers’ attempts to enhance privacy might increase 
consumers’ trust beliefs and thus mitigate privacy 
concern [25]. Furthermore, trusting beliefs might, in 
addition to mitigating concerns of privacy risks, 
increase the users’ willingness to disclose information 
through LBS [25]. Finally, even though there is 
evidence of the users’ initial concern becoming 
alleviated after a short period of time [26], according to 
Xu et al., privacy concern can hinder the use through 
inhibiting the adoption altogether [27]. 
 
3. Research method  
To study valuation of location privacy in a one-time 
sharing situation, we conducted a study using a mobile 
crowdsourcing platform Crowdee [28]. While it is 
likely that the real-life user of LBS does not have a full 
control of the integrity of their data flows [29] and thus 
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cannot make a sound and fully informed value 
calculation, we make a simplification to concentrate on 
the accepted payment based on four different 
scenarios, leaving the assessment of knowledge and 
control to further studies. The users of the platform 
could take part in a task that had a base payment of 
0.10 €, with a possible bonus mentioned. The size of 
the bonus was stated within the job, before the user 
could choose whether they wanted to share their 
location in that scenario or not. No other questions or 
tasks were involved so as to ensure that the bonus was 
indeed related with the location sharing task. Instead, 
merely opening the job, going through the description 
of the task and the location sharing task itself would 
grant the basic payment, irrespective of whether or not 
the participant decided to share their location. 
The study was conducted in Germany, and the 
prerequisite for taking part was fluency in German; the 
crowd workers had taken a language test to proof 
eligibility. The participants, after having taken the task, 
were presented randomly one of the following four 
scenarios, which assessed the effect of different 
recipients and subsequent data use on the willingness 
to disclose location: 
1. Trusted Advertiser: Sharing location with third 
parties, “for customer behaviour analytics 
purposes by a third party”. A fake advert by a 
trusted advertiser was shown within the task. 
2. Untrusted Advertiser: Sharing location with third 
parties, “for customer behaviour analytics 
purposes by a third party“. A fake advert by an 
untrusted advertiser was shown within the task. 
3. Crowdee: Sharing location with the crowdsourcing 
platform Crowdee, with an explanation given, that 
the data is used “For customer behaviour analytics 
purposes”. 
4. Crowdee Users: Sharing in a social situation with 
other crowd workers. Simulated profile cards of 
other crowd workers were shown on the map 
within the task. 
 
For an untrusted advertiser, we chose a company 
that ranked in the bottom five out of the 127 companies 
analyzed in a study assessing the impact that German 
and international companies have on general wellbeing 
[30]. As an advertiser of high trustworthiness, we 
chose an organization ranking in the top five within the 
same study. Both of these chosen advertisers can be 
considered rather well known in Germany and 
familiarity could be assumed. The adverts had a link to 
the respective companies’ web sites. The companies 
were not informed about the study nor were they 
involved in it in any way. Whether or not the 
participants believed that the adverts were genuine was  
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the location sharing 
task with a trusted advertiser, and of a 
scenario with Crowdee users. Before sharing 
the location, which was also shown on a map, 
the user could see the additional bonus that 
would be given for sharing. Not sharing would 
lead to a compensation of only the base 
payment of 0.10€. 
 
not confirmed within the experiment, neither was it  
assessed whether or not the participants thought their 
location information would actually get in the 
possession of these advertisers. The scenarios were 
created as a web view that was integrated in the 
crowdsourcing platform, and the interaction flow 
between the app and the web view was seamless (cf. 
Figure 1 for a screenshot of the sharing situation with a 
trusted advertiser, and of that in a social situation).  
To share one’s location in any of the scenarios, the 
participant would select “Share” within the web view, 
in which case a bonus was paid in addition to the base 
payment of 0.10€. The amount of bonus was 
randomized between 0€ and 0.50€. A uniform 
distribution of payments with increments of 0.01€ was 
distributed between the tasks. In the case of the 
participant selecting “Do not share” within the web 
view, or leaving the web view without selecting either 
to share or not to share, only the base payment would 
be paid. As in real-life situations, the participants were 
not told about the possible subsequent data use or 
repurposing by third parties beyond the short 
explanation (e.g. “For customer behaviour analytics 
purposes”).  
Each eligible worker could take the task up to 10 
times. A buffer time of two hours was enforced 
between tasks to avoid the task being taken several 
times in the same location. Order effects are not 
expected to influence the results because the payments 
are randomized every time the user participates in the 
task. The effect of the physical location in which the 
task was taken is out of the scope of this research.  
1987
4. Measures 
All the questions in the used scales are presented 
in the Appendix. 
Risk perception (M = 4.57, SD = .95; 9 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .834) is measured using a scale under 
development, intending to measure the extent of risk 
perception on LBS. The questions are mainly based on 
previous research on which risks 
the users are concerned about in this context [1]. The 
responses for this scale, as well as for benefit 
perception, normative beliefs, and privacy concern 
were measured on a fully labelled 7-point answer scale 
from Fully agree (6) to Fully disagree (0).  
Benefit perception (M = 4.80, SD = .97; 6 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .907) includes general statements 
regarding the benefits offered by LBS.  
Normative Beliefs (M = 3.46, SD = .96; 3 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .745) assess the extent to which the 
user believe that their peers have expectations 
regarding their behaviour, in this case using LBS. 
Privacy concern (M = 4.31, SD = .87; 6 items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .719). The scale as reported by 
Morton [31] measures the user’s inclination to protect 
their personal privacy and minimize the disclosure of 
personal information, or their desire for privacy. A 
fully labelled 7-point response scale was used.  
Overall trust (M = 3.94, SD = .82; 16 items, 
Cronbach’s α = .857) includes a combination of all of 
the 4-item measures of the level of trust the user has 
towards each of the instances the location is to be 
shared with (cf. Table 1). We expect this to give an 
indication of how trusting the user is in general. 
 
5. Results  
In total 1064 tasks were taken, out of which 72 
were not carried out completely, meaning that the 
participant did not choose to either share or not to 
share their location. In 58 cases of these 72, there was a 
problem with the location setting of the phone and thus 
the map did not load, and as a consequence we 
disregard these cases from analysis; the remaining 14 
cases are handled as “not shared”. Additionally, all 
records from participants who were found cheating in  
  
Table 1. Trustworthiness of the instances the 
location is to be shared with in the different 
scenarios was measured on a four-item scale. 
 
Trusted 
Advertiser 
Untrusted 
Advertiser 
Crowdee 
Crowdee 
Users 
M 4.94 2.18 4.77 3.87 
SD 1.03 1.10 1.00 1.07 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
.781 .768 .734 .750 
 
Figure 2. Statistically significant differences 
were found in the trustworthiness of the 
different instances the participants would 
share their location with. 
 
the follow-up study were disregarded, as well as those 
showing no variance in acceptance of the location 
sharing task, when at least two tasks were taken. The 
analysis in the following section is done based on the 
remaining 435 tasks that were carried out. Out of these, 
in 84% of the cases, the location was shared.  
 
5.1. Demographics  
 
190 unique crowd workers participated in the task, 
which could be repeated up to ten times. Altogether 
109 crowd workers participated in the first follow-up 
questionnaire including the demographic questions and 
16 questions about trustworthiness of the four 
recipients of location data; 105 responses were 
accepted based on the used trapping questions. 116 
participated in the follow-up questionnaire regarding 
risks, benefits and privacy concerns when using 
location-based applications. Out of these, 107 were  
accepted based on the trapping questions. The 13 
disqualified participants were left out of all the further 
analysis.The crowd was mainly young adults (M = 
28.76, SD = 8.83). 60% of the participants were male. 
33% had a university degree, and 46% were students. 
35% of the participants stated that they are either 
currently or in the past practicing in the IT field.  
 
5.2. Trustworthiness 
 
We confirmed our expectations that the 
organization that we had chosen as a trusted advertiser 
was trusted significantly more than the one chosen  
as an untrusted advertiser. Also, Crowdee users were 
trusted more than the untrusted advertiser, but less than 
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Figure 3. Logistic regression of acceptance of 
a location sharing task as a function of 
payment in Euro, giving a probability that a 
location is shared.  
 
Crowdee or the trusted advertiser. The difference in 
trustworthiness between Crowdee and the trusted 
advertiser turned out not to be statistically significant; 
otherwise the trustworthiness scores differ from one 
another significantly (F(3, 424), = 162.46, p < .001, cf. 
Figure 2). Overall trust is found to have a strong 
negative correlation with privacy concern (rs = -.55, p 
< .001), suggesting that users who are generally 
trusting towards organizations have also less privacy 
concern. 
 
5.3. Location sharing 
 
We consider the binary location sharing task 
acceptance data per level of the amount paid for the 
task. A statistically significant effect was found for the 
sharing, with payment being higher in the cases when 
location was shared (t(433) = -4.87, p < .001). We also  
 
Table 2. Parameters for a logistic regression 
model (cf. Eq. 1) for the location sharing 
scenarios with trusted and untrusted 
advertiser, as well as for the whole data set. 
The model fit in each case is also listed. The 
variables are payment (x1) and trust (x2). 
 
Trusted 
Advertiser 
Untrusted 
Advertiser 
Total 
θ1 
9.598,  
p = .003 
3.88,  
p = .026 
30.82,  
p < .021 
θ2 .477,  
p = .146 
.534,  
p = .018 
1.193,  
p = .025 
b -1.967 -1.023 -5.031 
R2 .27 .15 .45 
find that the scenario has a significant impact on 
sharing location (Χ2(3) = 15.22, p = .002). Risk percep- 
tion, as well as privacy concern, were found to be 
connected with sharing a location less frequently, and 
benefit perception as well as the overall trust were 
found to be connected with more frequent location 
disclosure; t(52) = 2.54, p = .014 (risk perception), 
t(52) = 2.193, p = .033 (privacy concern), t(52) = -
2.31, p = .025 (benefit perception), t(52) = -2.05, p = 
.046 (overall trust). No effect was found with 
normative beliefs. 
 
5.3.1.  Logistic regression. The probability with which 
a user shares their location was modeled as a logistic 
regression, given by: 
𝑷(𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 | 𝒙) =
𝟏
𝟏+𝒆−(𝜣·𝒙+𝒃)
  ,   (1) 
where 𝒙 = (𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, … , 𝒙𝒏)
𝒕 are the constituent 
variables, and 𝜣 = (𝜽𝟏, 𝜽𝟐, … , 𝜽𝒏)  and 𝒃 the 
corresponding model parameters. 
This was applied to the labeled dataset, estimating the 
two-class problem of whether or not the location 
sharing task is accepted as a function of payment (x1). 
For the above single-variable model, we obtained θ1 = 
.698 and b = 4.664 (cf. Figure 3). This model however 
explains less than ten percent of the variance in sharing 
behaviour (Nagelkerke R
2 
= .09). 
In order to enhance the model, we now consider 
also the effect of risks and benefits. This gives us a 
three-variable model, where variables payment (x1), 
risks (x2), and benefits (x3) get the corresponding 
parameter values θ1 =  4.72, θ2 =  -.38, θ3 = .308, and b 
= 1.05. Having included these additional variables, the 
explained variance is now somewhat improved 
(Nagelkerke R
2 
= .14), and the model classifies 
correctly 84.8% of the cases. 
To further assess the sharing behaviour, we divided 
the data based on the sharing scenarios within the 
crowdsourcing tasks, illustrating the probability of 
accepting a location sharing job per payment in the 
four different scenarios. We modeled also these four 
cases independently as logistic regression. For the 
scenario Trusted Advertiser, for the variable payment 
(x1) the parameter θ1 = 9.31 and b = .32, explaining 
nearly a quarter of the sharing behaviour (Nagelkerke 
R
2 
= .233).  For the scenario Untrusted Advertiser, θ1 = 
3.987 and b = .131, and (Nagelkerke R
2 
= .08). For the 
scenarios Crowdee and Crowdee Users, the model 
turned out to be not significant (p = .051). These as 
well as the total sharing rates are illustrated in Figure 3 
as a function of payment. These results suggest that 
payment influences the location sharing behaviour 
mainly in the cases where the location would be  
also shared with an advertiser. Furthermore, when the  
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Figure 4. Location sharing probability as a 
function of trust and payment, in the scenario 
where the untrusted advertiser would also get 
the data. It can be seen that if the user has 
very high trust in the advertiser the sharing is 
very likely; however, trust was generally very 
low towards this advertiser. 
 
advertiser is untrusted, the users are less likely to share 
a location, and a premium would need to be paid to 
reach the same sharing probability as in the case of a 
trusted advertiser. 
To further assess the influence of trust, we added 
trust (towards the organization with which the location 
information would be shared) to each of the four 
models, illustrating the probability of accepting a 
location sharing job as a function of payment and trust. 
For the scenarios Crowdee and Crowdee Users, the 
model was not statistically significant (p = .13, and p = 
.265, respectively). In Table 2 are listed the parameters 
for the variables payment (x1) and trust (x2), describing 
the regressions in scenarios Trusted and Untrusted 
Advertiser as well as for the whole data set (with 
overall trust used as a variable x2). As an illustration, 
  
 
Figure 5. Location sharing in the scenario of 
sharing with a trusted advertiser, as a function 
of trust and payment. Higher acceptance rate 
is reached with a lower payment than in the 
scenario with untrusted advertiser. 
 
Figure 6. Total location sharing probability 
given as a logistic regression function of 
privacy concern measured as desire for 
privacy and the paid bonus in Euro.  
 
the location sharing probability in the scenario 
Untrusted Advertiser is presented as a function of trust 
and payment in Figure 6, and that in the scenario 
Trusted Advertiser in Figure 5. Finally, the influence of 
privacy concern was assessed by modelling location 
sharing as a function of payment (x1) and desire for 
privacy (x2), cf. Figure 6.  
The obtained parameter values were θ1 = 24.24, θ2 
= -.971, and b = 3.89. The model could explain nearly 
half of the variance in the sharing behaviour 
(Nagelkerke R
2 
= .45), and classify correctly 82% of 
the cases. The result suggests that privacy concern and 
payment have a strong influence on users sharing 
behaviour, cf. Figure 6. 
 
5.3.2. Logarithmic modelling. Next, we take a 
deeper look at the results by considering the 
acceptance rate as percentages. We conducted a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, which confirmed the earlier results 
that there are differences in location sharing based on 
the scenario  (χ2(3) = 10.229, p = 0.017). Further pair- 
 
Table 3. The results of pair-wise Mann-
Whitney U-tests, comparing the differences in 
location sharing rates in the four scenarios. 
Cells marked with a dash (-) are duplicates. 
Sharing in scenario Untrusted Advertiser 
differs significantly from the other scenarios, 
being in each case less frequent. No other 
statistically significant differences were found. 
 
Trusted 
Advertiser 
Untrusted 
Advertiser 
Crowdee 
Crowdee 
Users 
Trusted 
Advertiser 
n.a. 
χ2= 692.0 
p = .005 
χ2= 973.0  
p = .851 
χ2=996.5 
p =.862 
Untrusted 
Advertiser 
- n.a. 
χ2= 
669.5 
p = .004 
χ2= 681.0 
p = .004 
Crowdee - - n.a. 
χ2= 984.0  
p = .948 
1990
 
 
 
 
 
 
wise Mann-Whitney U-tests with Bonferroni correction  
(the new alpha level being α = .0083) showed less 
frequent location sharing in the scenario Untrusted 
Advertiser than in the other scenarios. This highlights 
that context seems to cause differences in location 
sharing behaviour even if the sharing rate is rather 
high. There are no notable differences in overall 
sharing frequencies between scenarios Trusted 
Advertiser, Crowdee, and Crowdee Users. The 
statistical results from the pair-wise comparisons are 
listed in Error! Reference source not found. These 
results do not take payment levels into consideration. 
We assume that acceptance of a location-sharing 
task is dependent on the payment following a 
logarithmic model. This would mean that a higher 
payment yields higher sharing until, when reaching a 
certain threshold, plateaus. With this assumption, we 
take the percentage of accepted tasks for each payment 
level and fit this data on a logarithmic model. This 
gives a prediction showing the percentage of users 
sharing their location for a given price, as illustrated in 
Figure 7. We find that payment explains a significant 
proportion of the sharing behaviour, R
2
 = .44, p < .001.  
 
6. Discussion 
We conducted an empirical study assessing users’ 
location valuations on a mobile crowdsourcing 
platform. The results suggest that the majority of users 
reveal their location in all situations, even when not 
compensated for the extra information, and thus get no 
obvious benefit from doing so. This finding is quite 
similar to the one stated previously by Rose [15]. 
However, despite of being very compliant, differences 
in location valuation patterns can be found. The results 
show an increasing willingness to share with an 
increasing payment. Perceived benefits seem to affect 
location sharing positively, while risk perception as 
well as privacy concern seem to have a negative 
impact. Furthermore, our results suggest that the found 
differences in sharing patterns stem from varying trust 
– the users are less willing to share if the location is 
shared with an instance that they do not trust. These 
differences are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
6.1. Location sharing with third parties: 
Trusted Advertiser 
 
In the two scenarios of sharing with advertisers, the 
participants were not explicitly told which companies 
or organizations might get access to the location data. 
Instead, they were explained that their data would be 
shared with third parties such as advertisers. On the 
page that showed their location on a map and where 
the participant could choose to either share their 
location or not to share, an advert by an untrusted 
advertiser was shown in a prominent location. We find 
that the disclosing rate is significantly higher in this 
scenario compared to the one with an untrusted 
advertiser. Thus, it seems that there is granularity in 
location valuations with respect to sharing with 
advertisers. Also, interestingly, the overall disclosing 
rate does not differ statistically from the scenarios 
where sharing happens with Crowdee or other 
Crowdee Users. However, whereas in the scenarios 
Crowdee and Crowdee Users the sharing does not 
depend on the payment, in the scenarios where an 
advertiser is involved it does. This suggests that 
sharing in this situation is not solely due to 
benevolence. The users start possibly thinking of 
location sharing as a transaction; not only in terms of 
compromising privacy in exchange of a gained service, 
but also in terms of how much is the location 
information worth. In an earlier study, the users were 
willing to pay a small premium for enhanced privacy 
[16]. In our case, the users seem to accept a more 
privacy-intrusive situation if they get a small monetary 
bonus for it. 
 
6.2. Location sharing with third parties: 
Untrusted Advertiser  
 
In this scenario, there was an advert shown at the 
time of the location sharing task by an advertiser of 
low trustworthiness. From our results, showing that in 
this scenario the users were less willing to disclose 
location than otherwise, we can assume that the 
participants did consider the possibility of this 
Figure 7. Location sharing frequency per 
payment on a crowdsourcing application 
follows a logarithmic model, where acceptance 
of a location sharing task increases from 40% 
to nearly 100% as the payment given for the 
task rises from 0€ to .50€. 
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particular advertiser getting access to their location 
data. The users seem to require a small premium to 
share their location in this scenario in comparison to 
other disclosing situations. This result highlights that, 
even if the differences are small, the users do evaluate 
the value of their location data, possibly based on the 
risks that they perceive being involved in sharing. 
 
6.3. Location sharing with other Crowdee Users  
 
In the scenario of sharing in a social situation, the 
participant was shown on a map profile cards of “other 
users” in the area. Our hypothesis was that the 
participants would think twice about location sharing if 
it also has social implications, and we expected to see 
lower sharing scores in this scenario. This did not 
happen, which could be also due to the fact that the 
location would not be shared with any users in the 
participants’ actual social circles, but with strangers. 
Another explanation would be that users have a 
tendency to feel like they belong to a group (in this 
case the Crowdee users), and favor the other 
individuals who belong to the group [32].  
 
6.4. Location sharing in general 
 
In our study, we could explain up to nearly 50% of 
the variance in location sharing behaviour by the given 
payment, or with a model combining the payment and 
trust or privacy concern. Perceived risks and benefits 
were also found to influence location sharing, however, 
assessing what their contribution to the total sharing 
model is would require a larger data set. Trust and 
privacy concern are strongly correlated – it seems like 
a plausible explanation for the sharing patterns that if a 
user trusts the instance they are asked to share location 
with no privacy concern are present, and sharing is 
very likely. Also vice versa: mistrust towards an 
advertiser provokes privacy concern, and inhibits 
sharing. 
Multiple other variables are likely to play a role 
when deciding on whether to disclose location or not. 
For example, we did not consider the effect of the 
physical location on the disclosure rate. Based on 
earlier studies, users are more willing to share a 
location if it has a large and diverge set of visitors [20]. 
For example, users might be more willing to share their 
location if they are out in the city, and less so if they 
are at home. 
  
7. Limitations 
Using a crowdsourcing platform allowed for 
studying the effect of price in a realistic scenario 
without the need to resort to asking users about the 
price hypothetically, making the platform a well 
working solution for addressing the problem. However, 
our results might be specific to crowd workers, and in 
particular, the users of the crowdsourcing platform 
used in this study. Repeating the study with another 
platform would shed light on the reliability of the 
results. 
Volunteered information might fundamentally 
differ from information that is collected for example 
through ambient sensors. This leads to certain 
populations being overly represented in the data as 
some groups do not voluntarily disclose information 
[33].  
Disclosure using LBS is not necessarily so straight-
forward that the user could make a fully informed 
decision about the benefit-privacy transaction. It can be 
that the user is not fully knowledgeable about the 
disclosure in the first place. Even more importantly 
than that, once the disclosure has happened, the user 
has no way of knowing what happens to the data – 
about the possible subsequent use of the data, how it is 
being analyzed and aggregated with other information, 
and distributed to other parties. This leads to anxiety of 
control over one’s personal information [10], to loss of 
contextual integrity when the information is handled 
and distributed contrary to the users’ expectations [9], 
and to powerlessness in the absence of a reasonable, 
privacy preserving choice [29]. This study, however, 
did not take into account the complexity of location 
sharing, but made a simplification and assumed that the 
decision to share or not to share a location depends 
mainly on who is asking (and why), as well on the 
given payment. The further analysis of the awareness 
of the information flow the user has in the disclosure 
situation remains a topic for further studies. 
Also, considering the high number of times the 
users might, either purposely or unknowingly disclose 
their location to different parties throughout the day, it 
is highly unlikely that in each of these events the ratio 
of received benefits and privacy cost would be 
systematically evaluated by the user, let alone 
assessing the possible long term impact of a disclosure. 
Therefore, the results cannot be directly generalized. 
 
8. Conclusions 
We conducted a study examining location 
valuations in one-time sharing situations using a 
mobile crowdsourcing platform. We find that the 
sharing scenario, as well as the paid amount, influence 
the sharing of location. However, the payment is found 
to have an impact mainly in the scenarios where the 
location would also be shared with advertisers, even 
though the needed payment to compensate for the 
location sharing seems to be minimal. Also trust, 
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perceived benefits and risks, as well as privacy concern 
influence the users’ willingness to share location. We 
conclude that users are very compliant and accept 
sharing their location in most cases, an exception being 
sharing with an untrusted advertiser. A more privacy-
intrusive situation is accepted for a small extra 
payment.  
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Appendix  
 
In the following scales, the items that were inverted 
prior to analysis in order to match with the scale direction are 
marked with an asterisk (*). The question order was 
randomized. 
 
A1. Location-Based Services Risks Scale 
1. I believe that there are no risks involved when mobile 
applications collect location information that is 
anonymous. * 
2. I believe that mobile applications track users’ location 
only if it is required for their functionality. * 
3. I am worried that using location-based applications 
would lead to unsolicited marketing. 
4. I am worried that if I use location-based applications, I 
might get tracked by the government. 
5. Using location-based applications involves the risk of 
getting stalked. 
6. I am worried that using location-based applications 
would lead to my home location being revealed. 
7. I am worried that using location-based applications 
involves the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft. 
8. I am worried that if I use location-based applications, 
strangers might know too much about my activities.  
9. Using location-based applications poses a threat to my 
personal safety. 
 
A2. Location-Based Services Benefits Scale 
1. Using location-based services is practical.  
2. Using location-based applications is useful. 
3. Using location-based applications enables me to 
accomplish tasks more quickly. 
4. Using location-based applications is fun. 
5. Using location-based applications makes 
communication faster. 
6. Using location-based applications simplifies 
communication. 
7. Location-based applications enhance my social life. 
(This item was left out of the final analysis because it 
deteriorated the internal consistency of the scale.) 
 
A3. Location-Based Services Normative Beliefs Scale 
1. People who I care about and who care about me think 
that I should use location-based applications. 
2. People who are important to me think that I should use 
location-based applications. 
3. Everybody uses location-based applications. (This item 
was left out of the final analysis because it deteriorated 
the internal consistency of the scale.) 
4. People who I care about and who care about me think 
that there are certain benefits in using location-based 
applications. 
 
A4. Dispositional Privacy Concern Scale 
1. It is the most important thing for me to protect my 
privacy. 
2. I'm comfortable telling other people, including 
strangers, personal information about myself. * 
3. I try to minimize the number of times I have to provide 
personal information about myself. 
4. I am comfortable sharing information about myself with 
other people unless they give me reason not to. * 
5. I have nothing to hide, so I am comfortable with people 
knowing personal information about me. * 
6. I try to change the topic of a conversation if people start 
asking too much about me. 
 
A5. Trustworthiness Scale 
These questions were repeated for each of the four 
instances with whom the location would be shared 
(altogether 16 questions). 
 
1. How trustworthy do you find <the instance with whom 
the location would be shared>? 
2. How reliable do you find <the instance with whom the 
location would be shared>? 
3. In general, how risky do you find it to give location 
information to <the instance with whom the location 
would be shared>? 
4. How concerned are you that <the instance with whom 
the location would be shared> could harm you if it had 
your location data?
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